We study the Markov equilibria of a model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good. We compare economies with reversibility, where investments can be positive or negative to economies with irreversibility, where investments are nonnegative and the public good can only be reduced by depreciation. With reversibility, there is a continuum of equilibrium steady states: the highest equilibrium steady state of g is increasing in n, and the lowest is decreasing. With irreversibility, the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero: the highest steady state possible with reversibility. In both cases, the highest steady state converges to the efficient steady state as agents become increasingly patient.
Introduction
All of the most significant types of free rider problems are characterized by two key features. First, they are dynamic. Public goods, for example, are often durable: it takes time to accumulate them and they depreciate slowly, projecting their benefits for many years. Similarly, environmental problems depend on variables that slowly evolve over time like capital goods. In all these examples what matters for the agents in the economy is the stock of the individual contributions accumulated over time. Second, they are characterized by some form of irreversibility. Investments in public goods are not easily transformed in other forms of consumption (think of a bridge or military equipment); similarly, the effects of pollution are hard (or impossible) to reverse. Although there is a large literature dedicated to free rider problems, little is known about dynamic problems with irreversibility. How large are the inefficiencies in dynamic environments with irreversibility? How the distortions with irreversibility compare to the distortions in static models and in dynamic models with reversibility? Perhaps surprisingly these questions have been posed only in very specific environments and never fully answered.
In this paper, we present a simple model of free riding to address these questions. In the model, n infinitely lived agents allocate their income between private consumption and contributions to a public good in every period. The public good is durable and depreciates at a rate d. We consider two scenarios. First, we study economies with reversibility, in which in every period individual investments can either be positive or negative. Second, we study an economy where the investment is irreversible, so individual investments are non-negative and the public good can only be reduced by depreciation. For both scenarios, we compare the sets of Markov equilibria.
We start the analysis by studying the set of equilibria in the benchmark case in which there is reversibility. We show that there is a continuum of equilibria, each characterized by a different stable steady state. The set of equilibrium steady states has three notable features. First, it always includes in its interior the level of the public good that would be reached in equilibrium by an agent alone in autarky: the steady state in a community with n agents can be either larger or smaller than when an agent is alone. Second, the upper-and lower-bounds of the set of equilibrium steady states are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in n. This implies that as the number of agents increases, the set of equilibrium steady states expands, and the free rider problem can either improve or worsen with the rise of population. Finally, for any size of population n and any rate of depreciation, the highest (and best) steady state converges to the efficient level as the discount factor converges to one. When agents are sufficiently patient, therefore, the efficient steady state can be achieved with simple Markovian strategies. This is perhaps remarkable since we have a non-cooperative dynamic free riding game, with arbitrarily large numbers of players, and the Markov assumption rules out reward or punishment strategies that are contingent on individual actions or complicated histories, as required in folk-theorem constructions supporting cooperation in repeated games.
In an economy with irreversibility the set of equilibrium steady states is a subset of the set of equilibrium steady states with reversibility. We show that as the rate of depreciation converges to zero, this set converges to a unique point corresponding to the highest equilibrium steady state that can be supported with irreversibility. This finding has two immediate implications. First, for sufficiently small levels of depreciation, an agent is always better off in a community than in autarky; a fact that, as we said, is not true with reversibility. Second, as the discount factor converges to one, all equilibrium steady states with irreversibility are approximately efficient if the rate of depreciation is small. From these results we conclude that irreversibility has a beneficial effect on welfare because it eliminates inefficient equilibria possible in economies with reversibility.
The fact that reversibility affects so much the equilibrium set may appear surprising. In a planner's solution the irreversibility constraint is irrelevant: it affects neither the steady state (that is unique), nor the convergence path.
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The reason why irreversibility is so important in a dynamic free rider game is precisely the fact that equilibrium investments are inefficiently low and the irreversibility may limit the inefficiency by acting as a commitment device. The intuition is as follows. In the equilibria of a dynamic free rider problem, both with and without irreversibility, the agents holds back their individual contributions for fear that they will crowd out the contributions of other players, or even be appropriated by other agents in future periods.
In economies with irreversibility, however, the irreversibility constraint may limit the ability of the agents to appropriate the accumulated public good. In general the irreversibility constraint is binding only for states that are so high that they are not reached on the equilibrium path; still, the fact that in these states free riding will be limited affects the entire equilibrium investment function. In states just below the point in which the constraint is binding, the agents know that the constraint will not allow the other agents to reduce the public good when it passes the threshold. These incentives induce higher investments and a higher value function, with a ripple effect on the entire investment function. This effect induces the agents to cooperate more and results in a unique (high) stable steady state when depreciation is sufficiently small.
From a purely methodological point of view, the paper develops a novel approach to characterize the Markov equilibria that can have more general applicability in the study of stochastic games with discrete time. The idea is to construct Markov strategies that induce a weakly concave value function: the flat regions in the value function allow additional freedom in choosing the players' reaction functions and in sustaining the equilibrium. This approach is essential to prove existence of a Markov equilibrium in the difficult case of an economy with irreversibility.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the large literature on dynamic public good games with reversibility. Classic contributions include Levhari and Mirman [1981] who studied a dynamic common pool problem; and Fershtman and Nitzan [1991] who studied a dynamic public good contribution game. More recent works include Dockner and Long [1993] , Dutta and Radner [2004] and Harstad [2012] , who have studied dynamic free rider games applied to environmental problems; 2 and Battaglini and Coate [2007] , Besley and Persson [2011] , Battaglini et al. [2012b] , Besley, Ilzetzki and Persson [2012] who have studied dynamic public good games in which investments are chosen in a collective decision making process.
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As in our work, this literature has studied the inefficiencies arising in the Markov equilibria of dynamic public goods games. In these works, the focus on Markov equilibria is justified by the fact that when investments are reversible, the set of subgame perfect equilibria is generally uninformative with sufficiently patient agents because Folk Theorem arguments apply. Contrary to our work, however, this literature has focused exclusively on environments with reversible investments. In our paper we propose a framework that allows the comparison of the set of Markov equilibria in economies with reversibility and irreversibility.
The second strand of literature to which our paper is related is the research on monotone contribution games, notably Lockwood and Thomas [2002] and Matthews [2011] . 4 These papers study games in which players play a repeated prisoner's dilemma with a strong form of irreversibility: the individual players' actions can never decrease, depreciation is zero. This literature has been focused on the comparison of the most efficient subgame perfect equilibria in economies with reversibility (when the actions can increase and decrease) and with irreversibility (when the actions cannot decrease). The main finding of this literature is that when the discount factor is sufficiently high, irreversibility always induces less efficient allocations because it limits the effectiveness of 2 Other contributions studying dynamic free rider problems in the framework introduced by Fershtman and Nitzan [1991] include Wirl [1996] , Rubio and Casino [2002] , Itaya and Shimomura [2001] , and Fujiwara and Matsueda [2009] .
3 In Battaglini and Coate [2007] , Battaglini et al. [2012b] policies are chosen by a legislature through a process of non cooperative bargaining; in Besley and Persson [2011] and Besley, Ilzetzki and Persson [2012] policies are chosen by a randomly selected dictator.
4 A number of significant papers in the monotone games literature are less directly related. These papers require additional assumptions that make their environments hard to compare to ours. Gale [2001] provides a general framework of monotone games with no discounting, and applies it to a contribution game in which agents care only about the limit contributions as t → ∞. Admati and Perry [1991] , Compte and Jehiel [2004] and Marx and Matthews [2000] consider environments in which the benefit of the contribution occurs at the end of the game if a threshold is reached and in which players receive either partial or no benefit from interim contributions. The first two of these papers, moreover, assume that players contribute sequentially, one at a time.
trigger strategies in punishing deviations. Compared to the work on dynamic public good games mentioned above, this literature obtains results that are not restricted to Markov equilibria; its main results, however, critically depend on the assumptions that players have a dominant strategy in the stage game and that the rate of depreciation of the state variable is exactly zero. As we formally show in Section 7, for any positive rate of depreciation (even if arbitrarily small), the efficient allocation is an equilibrium both with and without irreversibility with sufficiently high (but still strictly less than one) discount factors: the result that irreversibility worsens the equilibrium outcome is true only with exactly zero depreciation when agents are patient. Thus, the insights that can be gained from the approach of looking at the set of all subgame perfect equilibria with patient players are limited to the special case where one assumes exactly zero depreciation and a Prisoner's Dilemma structure. This justifies our analysis, that follows the traditional approach of focusing on the set of Markov equilibria. Focusing on Markov equilibria, in our work we identify a new channel through which irreversibility affects the equilibrium outcome that leads to the opposite conclusion reached by the literature on monotone games and that does not depend on any special assumptions about the discount factor, the rate of depreciation or the structure of payoffs.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline the model and in Section 3 we establish a benchmark by characterizing the Pareto optimal allocations. In Section 4 and 5 we characterize the equilibria in economies with, respectively, reversibility and irreversibility. In Section 6 we study the effect of the irreversibility constraint comparing the equilibria with and without irreversibility. In Section 7 we discuss the effect of irreversibility on the set of subgame perfect equilibria and we discuss the relationship of our results with the literature on monotone contribution games mentioned above in greater detail. Section 8 concludes.
The model
Consider an economy with n agents. There are two goods: a private good x and a public good g. The level of consumption of the private good by agent i in period t is x i t , the level of the public good in period t is g t . An allocation is an infinite nonnegative sequence z = (x ∞ , g ∞ ) where
.., g t , ...). We refer to z t = (x t , g t ) as the allocation in period t. The utility U j of agent j is a function of z j = (x j ∞ , g ∞ ), where x j ∞ = (x j 1 , ..., x j t , ...). We assume that U j can be written as:
where u(·) is continuously twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave on [0, ∞), with lim g→0 + u (g) = ∞ and lim g→+∞ u (g) = 0. The future is discounted at a rate δ.
There is a linear technology by which the private good can be used to produce public good, with a marginal rate of transformation p = 1. The private consumption good is nondurable, the public good is durable, and the stock of the public good depreciates at a rate d ∈ [0, 1] between periods. Thus, if the level of public good at time t − 1 is g t−1 and the total investment in the public good is I t , then the level of public good at time t will be
We consider two alternative economic environments. In a Reversible Investment Economy (RIE) the public policy in period t is required to satisfy three feasibility conditions:
where W is the aggregate per period level of resources in the economy. The first two conditions guarantee that allocations are nonnegative. The third condition is simply the economy's resource constraint. In an Irreversible Investment Economy (IIE), the second condition is substituted with:
The RIE corresponds to a situation in which I t can be negative. The constraint that the state variable g t is non negative in a RIE is natural when g t is physical capital and it will maintained throughout the analysis. It should however be noted that it is not relevant for the results.
It is convenient to distinguish the state variable at t, g t−1 , from the policy choice g t and to reformulate the budget condition. If we denote y t = (1 − d)g t−1 + I t as the new level of public good after investing I t in the current period when the last period's level of the public good is g t−1 , then the public policy in period t can be represented by a vector (y t , x 1 t , ..., x n t ). Substituting y t , the budget balance constraint I t + n j=1 x j t ≤ W can be rewritten as:
With this notation, we must have x t ≥ 0, y t ≥ 0 in a RIE, and
The initial stock of public good is g 0 ≥ 0, exogenously given. Public policies are chosen as in the classic free rider problem, modeled by a voluntary contribution game. In period t, each agent j is endowed with w j t = W/n units of private good. We assume that each agent has full property rights over a share of the endowment (W/n) and in each period chooses on its own how to allocate its endowment between an individual contribution to the stock of public good (which is shared by all agents) and private consumption, taking as given the strategies of the other agents. The individual contribution by agent j at time t is denoted i j t (so i j t = W/n − x j t ). In a RIE, the level of individual contribution can be negative, with the constraint that i
In a IIE, an agent's contribution must satisfy i j t ∈ [0, W/n] ∀j. The total economy-wide increase in the stock of the public good in any period is then given by the sum of the agents' individual contributions.
The state variable can have alternative interpretations.
Example 1 (Public capital). It is natural to assume that g is physical public capital. In this case it may seem natural to assume that the environment is irreversible. Once a bridge is constructed, it can not be decomposed and transformed back to consumption. Similarly, a painting donated to a public museum can not typically be withdrawn. The choice of the model to adopt (reversible or irreversible) should depend on the nature of the public good. If the public good is easily divisible and can be easily appropriated (as, for example, wood and other valuable resources from a forest) an agent may choose to appropriate part of the accumulated level. When withdrawals are possible (both because allowed, or because they can not be prevented), then the model may be described as RIE. The ability of the community to prevent agents from "privatizing" (or stealing) the stock of public good is a technological variable that may vary case to case.
Example 2 (Pollution). Suppose the state g is the level of global warming with the convention that the larger is g, the worse is global warming. The utility of an agent now is u(x, g) = x − c(g), where c(·) is increasing, convex and differentiable. We may assume that an agent can either increase or decrease global warming by choosing a "dirty" or a "clean" technology. This environment can be modelled as before if we assume that an increase in the "greenness" of the technology costs, at the margin, a dollar's worth of current consumption. Given this, we have, as before:
, where now i j t stands for the individual contribution to green technology (and it can be positive or negative).
To study the properties of the dynamic free rider problem described above, we study symmetric 5 The constraint i j t ≥ −(1 − d)gt/n guarantees that the sum of reductions in g is never larger than the total stock of public good, naturally it must be satisfied in any symmetric equilibrium. The analysis is similar if we allow each player to withdraw up to (1 − d)g since no player finds it optimal to reduce g to zero (the marginal utility of g at zero is infinity). In this case, however, we have to assume a rationing rule in case the individuals withdraw more than (1 − d)g. A simple rationing rule generating identical results is the following. At the beginning of each period player i can claim any amount ω i t ≤ (1 − d)g t−1 from the pool: if
, then the public good is rationed pro quota,
Markov perfect equilibria, where all agents use the same strategy, and these strategies are timeindependent functions of the state, g. A strategy is a pair (x(·), i(·)): where x(g) is an agent's level of consumption and i(g) is an agent's contribution to the stock of public good in state g.
Given these strategies, by symmetry, the stock of public good in state g is y(g)
For the remainder of the paper we refer to y(g) as the investment function. Associated with any
Markov perfect equilibrium of the game is a value function, v(g), which specifies the expected discounted future payoff to an agent when the state is g. An equilibrium is continuous if the investment function, y(g), and the value function, v(g), are both continuous in g. In the remaining of the paper we will focus on continuous equilibria. In the following we refer to equilibria with the properties described above simply as equilibria.
We are interested in studying the long term properties of the allocation. Given an equilibrium In what follows we will focus only on steady states that are stable and we will refer to stable steady state simply as steady states.
The planner's problem
As a benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium allocations, we first analyze the sequence of public policies that would be chosen by a benevolent planner who maximizes the sum of utilities of the agents. This is the welfare optimum because the private good enters linearly in each agent's utility function. The planner's solution is extremely simple in the environment described in the previous section: this feature will help highlighting the subtlety of the strategic interaction studied in the next two sections.
Consider first an economy with reversible investment. The planner's problem has a recursive representation in which g is the state variable, and v P (g), the planner's value function can be represented recursively as:
By standard methods (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott [1989] ), we can show that a continuous, strictly concave and differentiable v P (g) that satisfies (3) exists and is unique. The optimal policies have an intuitive characterization. When the accumulated level of public good is low, the marginal benefit of increasing y is high, and the planner finds it optimal to spend as much as possible on building the stock of public good: in this region of the state space y P (g) = W +(1−d)g and n j=1 x i = 0. When g is high, the planner will be able to reach the level of public good y * P (δ, d, n) that solves the planner's unconstrained problem: i.e.
Applying the envelope theorem, we can show that at the interior solution y * (4), we conclude that:
The investment function has the following simple structure. When g is lower than
is not feasible: the planner spends W on the public good so
When g is larger or equal than
, instead, the planner does not invest beyond y P (g) = y * P (δ, d, n). In this case, without loss of generality, we can set
Summarizing, we have:
This investment function implies that the planner's economy converges to one of two possible
, then the rate of depreciation is so high that the planner cannot reach y * P (δ, d, n), (except temporarily if the initial state is sufficiently large). In this case the steady state is y o P = W/d, and the planner invests all resources in all states on the equilibrium path. If W/d > y * P (δ, d, n), y * P (δ, d, n) is sustainable as a steady state. In this case, in the steady state y o P = y * P (δ, d, n), and the (per agent) level of private consumption is positive:
An economy in which the planner's optimum can be feasibly sustained as a steady state is the most interesting case. With this in mind we define:
In the rest of the analysis we focus on regular economies.
8
This is done only for simplicity:
extending the results presented below for economies with W/d ≤ y
The planner's optimum for the IIE case is not very much different. The planner finds it optimal to invest all resources for g ≤
, the planner finds it optimal to stop investing at y *
is not feasible, so it is optimal to invest 0, and to set y P (g) = (1 − d)g. This difference in the investment function for IIE, however, is essentially irrelevant for the optimal path and the steady state of the economy. Starting from any g 0 lower than the steady state y * P , levels of g larger or equal than
are impossible to reach, and the irreversibility constraint does not affect the optimal investment path.
Reversible investment economies 4.1 The equilibrium
We first study equilibrium behavior when the investment in the public good is reversible. Differently from the planner's case, in equilibrium no agent can directly choose the stock of public good y: an agent (say j) chooses only his own level of private consumption x and the level of its own contribution to the stock of public good. The agent realizes that in any period, given g and the other agents' level of private consumption, his/her contribution ultimately determines y. It is therefore as if agent j chooses x and y, subject to three feasibility constraints. The first constraint is a resource constraint that specifies the level of the public good:
This constraint requires that stock of public good y equals total resources, W +(1−d)g, minus the sum of private consumptions, x + (n − 1)x R (g). The function x R (g) is the equilibrium per capita level; naturally, the agent takes the equilibrium level of the other players, (n − 1)x R (g), as given.
The second constraint requires that private consumption x is non negative. The third requires total consumption nx to be no larger than total resources (1 − d)g + W . Agent j's problem can therefore be written as:
where v R (g) is his equilibrium value function.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all agents consume the same fraction of resources, so agent j can assume that in state g the other agents each consume:
where y R (g) is the equilibrium investment function. Substituting the first constraint of (7) in the objective function, recognizing that agent j takes the strategies of the other agents as given, and ignoring irrelevant constants, the agent's problem can be written as:
where it should be noted that agent j takes y R (g) as given.
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The objective function shows that an agent has a clear trade off: a dollar in contribution produces an individual marginal benefit u (y) + δv R (y); the marginal cost of the contribution is −1, a dollar less in private consumption.
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The two constraints define the maximal and minimal feasible level of public good given the other players' investments.
A symmetric Markov equilibrium is therefore fully described in this environment by two functions: an aggregate investment function y R (g), and an associated value function v R (g). Two conditions must be satisfied. First, for all values of g ≥ 0, y R (g) must solve (8) given v R (g).
The second condition for an equilibrium requires that the value function v R (g) to be consistent with the agents' strategies, and hence consistent with the equilibrium investment function, y R (g).
Each agent receives the same benefit for the expected investment in the public good, and consumes the same share of the remaining resources,
We can therefore define:
Definition 2. An equilibrium in a Reversible Investment Economy is a pair of functions, y R (·) and v R (·), such that for all g ≥ 0, y R (g) solves (8) given the value function v R (·); and for all
For a given value function, if an equilibrium exists, the problem faced by an agent looks similar to the problem of the planner, but with two important differences. First, in the objective function the agent does not internalize the effect of the public good on the other agents. This is the classic free rider problem, present in static models as well: it induces a suboptimal investment in g. The second difference with respect to the planner's problem is that the agent takes the contributions of the other agents as given. The incentives to invest depend on the agent's expectations about the other agents' current and future contributions, which are captured implicitly by the investment function y R (g). This radically changes the nature of the equilibria. Thus an agent may be willing to invest more or less today, depending on the exact shape of the investment function, which depends on how other agents plan to invest in the future at different levels of g. The relevant question is: Does this make the static free rider problem worse or better in a dynamic environment?
Characterization
To characterize the properties of equilibrium behavior, we first study a particular class of equilibria, the class of weakly concave equilibria. An equilibrium is said to be weakly concave if v(y; g) is weakly concave on y for any state g, where v(y; g) is the expected value of investing up to a level of public good, y:
We show that this class of equilibria is nonempty and we characterize its key properties. We then prove that there is no loss of generality in focusing on this particular class in order to study the set of equilibrium steady states. We therefore use the class of weakly concave equilibria as a tool to gain insight on the more general equilibrium properties of the game.
In a weakly concave equilibrium, the agent's problem (8) is a standard concave programming problem similar to (3). Because the objective function may have a flat region, however, the investment function typically takes a more general form than the planner's solution (6). Figure   1 represents a typical equilibrium. The equilibrium investment function will generally take the following form:
where g 2 , g 3 are two critical levels of g, and y(g) is a non decreasing function with values in
To see why y R (g) may take the form of (10) ( ) For g < g 2 , the objective function of (8) is strictly increasing in y: either resources are sufficient to reach the level that maximizes the unconstrained objective function and so y(g) ∈ g 2 , g 3 (in Figure 1 ,
or it is optimal to invest all resources (in Figure 1 ,
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For g > g 3 , the objective function is decreasing: the investment level is so high that the agents do not wish to increase g over y(g 3 ). For intermediate levels of
3 , an interior level of investment y ∈ g 2 , g 3 is chosen. This is possible because the objective function is flat in this region: an agent is indifferent between any y ∈ g 2 , g 3 .
The key observation here is that since the objective function has a flat region, the agents find it optimal to choose an increasing investment function in g 2 , g 3 : a weakly concave objective function, therefore, gives us more freedom in choosing the equilibrium investment function and even a higher level of investment. As we will see, this additional freedom allows to sustain a larger set of equilibria and a higher steady state level of g.
The open questions are whether the flat region in Figure 1 is a general equilibrium phenomenon or just an intellectual curiosity, and what degrees of freedom we have in choosing investment functions that are consistent with an equilibrium. For an investment curve as in Figure 1 to be an equilibrium, agents must be indifferent between investing and consuming for all states in g 2 , g 3 . If this condition does not hold, the agents do not find it optimal to choose an interior level y(g). The marginal utility of investments is zero if and only if:
Since the expected value function is (9), we have:
Substituting this formula in (11), we see that the investment function y(g) must solve the following differential equation:
This condition is useful only if we eliminate the last (endogenous) term: δv (y(g))y (g). To see why this is possible, note that y(g) is in g 2 , g 3 for any g ∈ g 2 , g 3 in the example of Figure 1 .
In this case, (11) implies δv (y(g)) = 1 − u (y(g)). Substituting this condition in (13) we obtain 11 In Figure 1 it is assumed that we have W + (1 − d)g > g 2 for for g ≥ g 1 , so the agent can afford to choose a level of y that maximizes the objective function (i.e. y ∈ g 2 , g 3 ) if and only if g ≥ g 1 . the following necessary condition:
Condition (14) shows that there is a unique way to specify the shape of the investment function that is consistent with a "flat" objective function in equilibrium. This necessary condition, however, leaves considerable freedom to construct multiple equilibria: (14) (14), and so uniquely defines y(g|y o R ) in g 2 , g 3 (see the dashed curve in Figure 1 ).
Proposition 1, presented below, shows that the degrees of freedom allowed by (14) are sufficient to characterize an important class of equilibrium steady states that is key in comparing equilibria in RIE to equilibria in IIE. We say that an equilibrium is monotonic if the investment function, y(g), is non decreasing in g. The following Proposition shows that monotonic equilibria always exists and that their associated steady states can be fully characterized in closed form.
12
Define the two thresholds:
We have: 
in this set is supported by a concave equilibrium with investment function as illustrated in Figure 1 . In no equilibrium, even if non-monotonic, the steady state can be larger than y * *
The class of monotonic equilibria is important for two reasons. First, it includes the equilibria that support the "right tail" of the set of steady states: it therefore allows to characterize the most efficient steady state, y * * R (δ, d, n). Second, they allow a neat comparison between RIE and IIE. As we will prove in below in Proposition 3, when d is sufficiently small (but not zero), the set of steady states in a IIE (monotonic or non-monotonic) is a strict subset of the set of steady states with monotonic equilibria. It follows that if there is an equilibrium in a RIE with a steady state higher (or lower) than all achievable steady states in a IIE, then this equilibrium can be assumed to be monotonic without loss of generality.
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12 The details about the equilibrium strategies are in the appendix 13 An analysis of non monotonic equilibria is presented in the working paper version (Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey [2012c] ) where we show, among other things, that the lowest possible steady state with non monotonic strategies is [u ] −
, n) and that equilibria with steady states lower than y * R (δ, d, n) always exist.
Proposition 1 shows that, as in the static model, an equilibrium allocation is always inefficient, even in the best equilibrium: punishing deviations with y * * R (δ, d, n) < y * P (δ, d, n) for any n > 1 and δ < 1. We can make three observation regarding the magnitude of the inefficiency. Let y(δ, d) be the steady state that would be achieved by an agent alone in autarky: y *
Corollary 1. In a RIE we have:
• The highest equilibrium steady state increases in n; the smallest steady state decreases in n.
• For any n and d, |y * *
The first point in Corollary 1 shows that the accumulated level of g in a community with n players may be either higher or lower than the level that an agent alone in autarky would accumulate. This is in contrast to the static case (when δ = 0), where the level of accumulation is independent of n. The second point shows that, in terms of the steady state level of g, the common pool problem may become better or worse as the size of the community increases. The multiplicity of equilibria, moreover, is not an artifact of the assumption of a finite population.
Finally, the last point highlights the fact that the best equilibrium steady state converges to the efficient level as δ → 1. What is remarkable in this result is the fact that the efficient steady state can be achieved with an extremely simple equilibrium (Markov) in which agents focus exclusively on the state g.
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Irreversible economies
We now turn to irreversible investment economies. When the agents cannot directly reduce the stock of the public good, the optimization problem of an agent can be written like (7), but with an additional constraint: the individual level of investment cannot be negative; the only way to reduce the stock of g, is to wait for the work of depreciation. Following similar steps as before, 14 The literature on quadratic differential games has shown examples in which the efficient steady state can be reached in a Markov equilibrium if the economy starts from specific initial steady states (see Rubio and Casino [2002] who qualify an important result by Dockner and Long [1993] ). To our knowledge, Corollary 1 presented above is the first result showing limit efficiency of the best steady state of a Markov equilibrium for generic initial steady state, generic utility and in discrete time.
we can write the maximization problem faced by an agent as:
where the only difference with respect to (8) is the second constraint. To interpret it, note that it can be written as y
the new level of public good cannot be lower than (1 − d)g plus the investments from all the other agents (in a symmetric equilibrium,
As in the reversible case, a continuous symmetric Markov equilibrium is fully described in this environment by two functions: an aggregate investment function y IR (g), and an associated value function v IR (g). The aggregate investment function y IR (g) must solve (16) given v IR (g). The value function v IR (g) must be consistent with the agents' strategies. Similarly, as in the reversible case, we must have:
We can therefore define: As pointed out in Section 3, when public investments are efficient, irreversibility is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation. The investment path chosen by the planner is unaffected because the planner's choice is time consistent: he never finds it optimal to increase g if he plans to reduce it later. In the monotone equilibria characterized in the previous section, the investment function may be inefficient, but it is weakly increasing in the state. Agents invest until they reach a steady state, and then they stop. It may seem intuitive, therefore, that irreversibility is irrelevant in this case too. In this section we show that, to the contrary, irreversibility changes the equilibrium set:
it induces the agents to significantly increase their investment and it leads to significantly higher steady states when depreciation is small.
To illustrate the impact of irreversibility on equilibrium behavior, suppose for simplicity that irreversibility, however, the constraint y ≥ g forces the investment to increase at a faster rate than y R (g). Because y R (g) is ex ante suboptimal, the "forced" increase in investment makes the objective function increase on the right of y o . But then choosing y o would no longer be optimal in state y o , so it cannot be a steady state.
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Does an equilibrium exist? What does it look like? Let y(g) be the unique solution of (14) that is tangent to the line y = (1 − d)g (see Figure 3 for an example). As it can be easily verified from (14), the point at which y(g) is tangent to y
This problem does not arise with the planner's solution because the planner's solution is time consistent. After the planner's steady state y * P is reached the planner would keep g at y * P . If the planner's is forced to increase y on the right of y * P , we would have a kink at y * P , but it would be a "downward" kink. Such a kink makes the objective function fall at a faster rate on the right of the steady state, so it preserves concavity and it does not disturb the optimal solution. The kink is "upward" in the equilibrium with irreversibility because the steady state is not optimal, so the irreversibility constraint, y ≥ g, increases expected welfare. This creates a sort of "commitment device" for the future; the agents know that g can not be reduced by the others (or their future selves).
16 Formally, y(g) is the solution of (14) with the initial condition y(y(δ, d)) the fixed point of this function:
The following Proposition states the existence result. In the appendix we provide a detailed description of the equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 2. In any IIE there is a equilibrium with an investment function as illustrated in Proposition 3. For any δ, n, we have:
The first part of the Proposition claims that in a RIE it is not possible to achieve steady states larger than the steady states reachable in a RIE; indeed, when depreciation is sufficiently small (but not necessarily zero), the set of steady states in a IIE is a strict subset of the set of steady states of monotone equilibria in RIE. The second part of the proposition shows that indeed this subset collapses to largest steady state possible in a RIE: so the irreversibility constraint helps the economy selecting an equilibrium that has the highest steady state among the equilibria feasible in a RIE.
The welfare effects of irreversibility
Given Propositions 1 and 3 we can now study the effect on the citizens' welfare of the irreversibility constraint by comparing the equilibrium sets in a RIE and in a IIE. In this section we focus on the effects of irreversibility on the efficiency of the steady state and of the convergence path.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Proposition 3 shows that even with an irreversibility constraint, the equilibrium allocation is always inefficient in a IIE since y * *
As shown in the next result, however, the irreversibility constraint alleviates the inefficiency in two important ways. First, when depreciation is sufficiently small (but not necessarily zero), no equilibrium steady state in a IIE is lower than the steady state in autarky y(δ, d). As we have seen in Proposition 1, this is never true in RIE. Second, the inefficiency disappears in all equilibria as citizens become increasingly patient and the rate of depreciation converges to zero.
Corollary 2. In a IIE, we have:
• There is a d > 0 such that for d < d, y * IR (δ, d, n) > y(δ, d).
• As δ → 1 the highest steady state converges to the efficient level. As δ → 1 and d → 0, every steady state in a IIE converges to the efficient level.
To understand the intuition why the irreversibility constraint eliminate inefficient equilibria leaving only the efficient steady state as d → 0, it is useful to first understand why we have multiple equilibria in a RIE. Consider the special case in which δ = 0 and so the free rider problem is static. In this case there is a unique equilibrium steady state at y o R = [u ] −1 (1), independent of n. In addition, the agents' actions are pure strategic substitutes: if agent j is forced to invest y o R /n + ∆, then all the other agents find it optimal to reduce their investment exactly by ∆/(n − 1). In general, however, strategies may or may not be strategic substitute when δ > 0. In equilibria that support steady states lower than y(δ, d) in Proposition 1, the players' contributions are always strategic substitutes.
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In equilibria with steady states larger than y(δ, d), on the contrary, the players' contributions must be strategic complements on the equilibrium path. Strategic complementarity is necessary in these equilibria because an agent is willing to keep investing until y o R > y(δ, d) only if he expects the other agents to react to his investment by increasing their own investments. This complementarity allows the agents to mitigate the free rider problem and partially "internalize" the public good externality. Whether the equilibrium is characterized by substitutability or complementarity, however, depends only on the players expectations: both cases are consistent with equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 3 shows that, even if the reversibility constraint is never binding on the equilibrium path, the most inefficient forms of strategic substitutability are not feasible in equilibrium in a IIE.
The intuition is as follows. Since we have decreasing returns in g, the investment in g declines over time. It follows that the constraint y ≥ (1−d)g must become binding when g is high enough.
When this happens the agents are forced to keep the investment higher than what they would like. Since the equilibrium is inefficiently low (because the agents do not fully internalize the social benefit of g), the constraint y ≥ (1 − d)g increases expected welfare in these states. The states where the constraint y ≥ (1 − d)g is binding are typically out of equilibrium (that is on the right of the steady state): in the equilibrium illustrated in Figure 3 , for example, the constraint is binding for g > y o IR (δ, d, n). The irreversibility constraint, however, has a ripple effect on the entire investment function. In a left neighborhood of y(δ, d), the constraint is not binding; still, the agents expect that the other agents will preserve their investment, so the strategic substitutability will not be too strong. Steady states lower than y o IR (δ, d) can occur with reversibility because the agents expect high levels of "strategic substitutability." Proposition 4 shows that when d is sufficiently low, the irreversibility constraint makes these expectations impossible in equilibrium, inducing an equilibrium steady state close to the maximal steady state of the reversible case, 18 We say that y(g) displays strategic substitutability if y (g) < 1 − d. Intuitively, we have substitutability when y (g) is less than 1 − d because in this case a marginal increase in investment at t by ∆ is followed by a marginal reduction in investment (otherwise the stock would increase by at least (1 − d) ∆). Similarly, we say that y(g) displays strategic complementarity if y (g) > 1 − d. What is the effect of the irreversibility constraint on the convergence path? A property that has been studied in the previous literature on contribution games is gradualism. We say that an equilibrium path is gradual if the steady state is not reached in finite time. Focusing on the most efficient subgame perfect convergence path and on environments with no depreciation, the previous literature on monotone games has argued that, if the discount factor is sufficiently high, the convergence path is gradual if and only if there is irreversibility (see in particular Lockwood and Thomas [2002] ). As we will discuss in the next section, this result holds only when depreciation is exactly zero.
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Our next result, in contrast, shows that for Markov equilibria, gradualism is a necessary property of the most efficient equilibrium path both in RIE and in IIE. The result, indeed, shows that with a low (but possibly positive) rate of depreciation, gradualism is necessary with irreversibility; with reversibility, gradualism is not necessary.
Corollary 3. For any δ, n, we have:
• Both in a RIE and in a IIE, any equilibrium path that converges to the highest steady state
• For any d ≥ 0, there is an equilibrium in which the steady state is reached in finite time in a RIE. In a IIE there is a d > 0 such that for d < d, all equilibrium paths are gradual.
To assess the significance this result, note that a benevolent planner would always converge in finite time to the efficient steady state. In equilibrium, therefore, the convergence path is always too slow, even when the equilibrium steady state is efficient or close to efficient. For example, as n → ∞ the highest steady state is efficient both in a RIE and in a IIE for any d and δ: the convergence path, however, is not efficient, so for all δ < 1 the welfare loss associated to gradualism can be substantial.
Subgame perfection and irreversibility
It is interesting to contrast the findings presented above to the findings of the literature on monotone contribution games that, previous to our work, has studied a form of irreversibility in dynamic investments. Equilibria in games with irreversibility that can be interpreted as public good contribution games like ours have been characterized by Lockwood and Thomas [2002] and 19 More precisely, for any d > 0, even if arbitrarily small, the steady state is reached in finite time in the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium both in a RIE and in a IIE for a sufficiently high (but still strictly less than 1) discount factor. Matthews [2012] . Both papers make two key assumptions: first, a zero contribution is a dominant strategy for all players, and so the game can be reduced to a repeated version of a prisoners' dilemma game; second, the state variable g can only stay constant or increase because depreciation is exactly zero. Under these conditions Lockwood and Thomas [2002] have characterized the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and Matthews [2012] has characterized all SPE.
20 Given these assumptions, this literature arrives to the conclusion that SPE in economies with irreversibility are more inefficient than in economies with reversibility, at least when agents are sufficiently patient. This finding is shown by proving a sort of Anti-folk Theorem: with reversibility, the efficient allocation is achievable in a SPE for a sufficiently high (but less than one) discount factor; with irreversibility, SPE are inefficient for all δ < 1. The intuition behind this result is that irreversibility limits the ability of agents to punish each other: in the worst continuation equilibrium players stop making contributions, but they can not eat or destroy the accumulated state g. This literature has also stressed the conclusion that the most efficient equilibrium path is characterized by gradualism (and so inefficiently slow) if and only if the investment is irreversible. The central new finding in this literature is the fact that any comparison at all can be made focusing on the large set of subgame perfect equilibria: the set of SPE is not generally very informative since in games with perfect information any individually rational payoff can generally be supported using simple trigger strategies.
The conclusion we reach in our work is, essentially, the opposite of the conclusion reached by this literature: irreversibility is good in our model, since it helps selecting more efficient equilibria. Do the differences in results depend on the specific assumptions mentioned above or on the fact that we restrict attention to a Markov equilibrium? The following result compares the most efficient SPE paths in RIE and IIE under the assumptions of our model. We say that an investment path is a SPE path if it coincides with the equilibrium path of a SPE.
Proposition 4. For any d > 0, there is a δ < 1 such that:
• The most efficient SPE path in a RIE and the most efficient SPE path in a IIE coincide with the Pareto efficient investment path for any δ > δ.
• Neither the most efficient SPE path in a RIE nor the most efficient SPE path in a IIE are characterized by gradualism for any δ > δ.
20 Matthews [2012] presents the most general analysis of monotone games to date. Although Matthews does not allow for depreciation, his model assumes very general specifications for the players' preferences and makes weak assumptions on the timing of contributions. For this general version of the model, Matthews can characterize a necessary condition for a SPE; for a characterization of the SPE, however, he requires the same assumptions as in Lockwood and Thomas [2002] .
Proposition 4 makes clear that the results on the effects of the irreversibility constraint obtained in the literature on monotone games critically depend on the assumption that depreciation is exactly zero: they can not be interpreted as results describing economies with a small, perhaps arbitrarily small, degree of depreciation, because when depreciation is not zero, results are qualitatively different. Indeed, it is always possible to find a sequence d n , δ n converging to {0, 1} such that the efficient allocation path is a SPE path for any n both in a RIE and in a IIE. Perhaps more seriously, Proposition 4 suggests that when d > 0 a comparisons between the most efficient SPE in RIE and IIE with patient players is not very insightful, since the efficient allocation is an equilibrium in both environments.
To see why the rate of depreciation is so important, consider for simplicity the environment in Lockwood and Thomas [2002] , where a zero contribution is a dominant strategy (an assumption that is not used in the proof of Proposition 4).
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When d = 0, the worst punishment for an agent is that all other agents stop making contributions, which is always the worst equilibrium by assumption (since zero contribution is a dominant strategy). But with d = 0 this punishment becomes increasingly irrelevant as g approaches the efficient steady state: in the worst case, a deviation is punished by an allocation that remains forever close to the efficient allocation. This is the reason why irreversibility makes it impossible to obtain an efficient allocation in Lockwood and Thomas [2002] . The environment is very different if d is positive, even if arbitrarily small.
In this case, after a deviation, the state would gradually decline and it would eventually approach zero. This convergence may certainly be slow when d is small: but as δ → 1 only the long run matters, so the punishment for a deviation is sufficiently high to induce all players to make the efficient contribution.
Our model differs from the models studied in the literature on monotone games in two crucial aspects. First, we do not assume that depreciation is necessarily exactly zero. This implies that we can compare the equilibria for any d: the case of d = 0 can indeed be seen as the limit of economies with a small level of depreciation. Second, we do not make the assumptions that the players have a dominant strategy in the stage game. In our model we assume standard preferences u(g) satisfying the Inada condition (u (g) → ∞ as g → 0 and u (g) → 0 as g → ∞). In this case the dominant strategy assumption is never verified since the players find it optimal to make strictly positive contributions, no matter what the other players do. These two feature of our model seem important in any dynamic theory of public good (or bad). Consider an example in which g is the state of the environment, the players are sovereign countries, and the players' investments correspond to the countries' efforts in reducing pollution (see Example 2 in Section 2 for details). In this environment it is natural to assume that if green investments are stopped, their beneficial effects would gradually depreciate: perhaps at a minimal, but certainly positive rate.
It also seems natural to assume that even if other countries do not care about the environment, the U.S.A. would still find it optimal to act unilaterally if the state is sufficiently low. A theory that makes predictions that critically depend on violating these two facts seems questionable in the context of the public good game we are interested in.
Since for the general environment we study the set of subgame perfect equilibria is so large that no meaningful comparison can be obtained, the focus on Markov equilibria seems quite natural, especially because it allows us to make sharp predictions. There are at least two additional reasons that make a Markov equilibrium an appealing solution concept. First, free rider problems are often intended to represent situations in which a large number of agents autonomously and independently contribute to a public good (Olson [1965, Chapter 1.B] ). In a large economy, it is therefore natural to focus on an equilibrium that is anonymous, independent from the action of any single agent and not relying on complex strategies that depend on long histories. This explains why the Markov equilibrium is widely adopted to study this type of problems.
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Recent experimental evidence, moreover, supports the predictions of Markov equilibria in stochastic games like the one studied here. 23 Second, the fact that we restrict the analysis to a subset of subgame perfect equilibria, makes our efficiency results stronger. Limit efficiency results as δ → 1 have been proven in Lockwood and Thomas [2002] and Matthews [2012] as well, but they rely on the assumption that deviations can be punished with a harsh equilibrium supported in dominant strategies. To our knowledge, limit efficiency has not been established in our environment before.
It seems indeed remarkable that both with reversibility and irreversibility there is an equilibrium allocation that converges to efficiency as δ → 1 in Markovian strategies, since the Markovian assumption rules out reward or punishment strategies that are contingent on individual actions or complicated histories.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a simple model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good. We have compared economies with reversible investments, in which in every period individual investments can either be positive or negative, to economies with irreversible investments, in which the public good can only be reduced by depreciation. For both cases we have characterized the set of steady states that can be supported by symmetric Markov equilibria in continuous strategies.
We highlight three main results. First, we have shown that economies with reversible investments have typically a continuum of equilibria. In the best equilibrium the steady state is higher in a community with n agents than in autarky, and it is increasing in n; in the worst equilibrium, the steady state is lower than in autarky, and it decreases in n. While in a static free rider's problem the players' contributions are strategic substitutes, in a dynamic model they may be strategic complements. Second, we have shown that in economies with irreversible investments, the set of equilibrium steady states is much smaller: indeed, as depreciation converges to zero, the set of equilibrium steady states converges to the best equilibrium that can be reached in economies with reversible investments. Irreversibility, therefore, helps the agents removing the coordination problem that plagues most of the equilibria in the reversible case, and so it necessarily induces higher investment. Third, as agents become increasingly patient, the best steady state in both economies with reversibility and irreversibility converges to the efficient level. As patience increases and depreciation decreases, all equilibrium steady states in an irreversible economy converge to the efficient level.
Although in this paper we have focused on a free rider problem in which agents act independently and there is no institution to coordinate their actions, the approach we have developed to characterize the Markov equilibria has a wider applicability and can be used to study dynamic games in other environments as well. In future work, it would be interesting to investigate economies with irreversible investments when public decisions are taken by legislative bargaining or other types of collective decision making processes.
Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let y * R (δ, d, n) and y * * R (δ, d, n) be defined by (15). Since we are in a regular economy, we have W/d > y * * R (δ, d, n). We first prove here that for any
, there is Markov equilibrium with steady state equal to y o . Each y o is supported by a concave equilibrium with investment function y R (g |y o ) described by (10), where
is the the unique solution of (14) with
This proves the "sufficiency" part of the statement. Then we prove that the steady state must be in [y *
. This proves the "necessity" part of the statement.
Sufficiency
To construct the equilibrium we proceed in 3 steps.
Step 1. We first construct the strategies for a generic y o and prove their key properties.
Let y (g |y o ) be the solution of the differential equation when we require the initial condition:
Let g 2 (y) be defined by (19). This, essentially, is the largest point between the point at which y (g |y o ) crosses from below W + (1 − d)g, and
Lemma A.1. We have:
• For any
Proof. We proceed in three steps, each corresponding to a bullet point in the statement.
Step 1. From (14),
Step 2. Note that y (y * *
Step 3. First note that y g
, we now define the investment function:
. This is the point at
Since y (g |y o ) has slope lower than one in
Step 2. We now construct the value functions corresponding to each steady state
By Theorem 3.3 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) , the right hand side of (20) is a contraction:
it defines a unique, continuous and differentiable value function v 0 (g |y o ) for this interval of g.
(differentiability follows from the differentiability of y (g |y o )). We have
From (14) we can write (for simplicity we write y (g |y o ) = y (g)):
. But then using (14) again allows to substitute 1 − u (y(g)) to obtain:
Iterating we have:
This implies u (g) + δv 0 (g; y o ) = 1.
In the rest of the state space we define the value function recursively. In
, the value function is defined as:
is concave and has slope larger or equal than 1.
, the result follows from the previous lemma. Assume therefore,
The statement then follows from this fact and Lemma A.3.
Consider g < g 1 (y o ). In g −1 , g 1 (y o ) the value function is defined as:
where g −1 = max 0,
. Assume that we have defined the value function in g ∈ g −t , g −(t−1) as v −t , for all t such that g −(t−1) > 0. Then we can define v −(t+1) as:
is concave and it has slope greater than or equal than 1.
Proof. We prove this by induction on t. Consider now the interval
. In this range we have
Where the last inequality follows from the fact that g ≤ g 2 (y o ) < y * * R (δ, d, n). Note, moreover, that the right and left derivative of v(g |y o ) at g 1 (y o ) are the same. To see this note that by the argument above, the left derivative is (1 − d)/n; by Lemma A.3, however, the right derivative is
is concave, it has derivative larger than 1. Assume that we have shown that for g ∈ g −t , g
is concave and u (g) + δv −t (g |y o ) > 1. Consider in g ∈ g −(t+1) , g −t . We have:
the same argument as above, moreover, v is concave at g −t . We conclude that for any g ≤ g 1 ,
is concave and it has slope larger than 1.
We can define the value function for g ≥ g 3 (y o ) as:
is concave and it has slope less than or equal than 1.
Previous lemmas imply u(g) + δv(g|y o ) is concave and has slope greater than or equal than 1 for g ≤ g 3 (y o ). This establishes the result.
Step 3. Define 
, so if y(g |y o ) ≥ 0. Both conditions are automatically satisfied by construction. If g < g 1 (y o ), we have u (y) + δv (y) ≥ 1 for all
is an unconstrained optimum, so again it is an optimal reaction function.
Necessity
We now prove that any steady state of a monotonic equilibrium must be in [y *
and that no steady state can be larger than y * * R (δ, d, n), even if non monotonic. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We first prove that y 
n y R (g) cannot be binding, else we would have y R (g) = (1 − 1/n)y R (g), so y R (g) = 0: but this is not possible in a neighborhood of y o R > 0. We consider two cases. 
). These observations imply:
, we must have: 
where the equality follows from the fact that y R (y
. By (24), we must therefore have:
This implies: 
Given this, we can write:
By an inductive argument, it is easy to see that g
differentiable and:
Since u (g m ) + δv R (g m ) ≥ 1, we have:
for all m. Consider the limit as m → ∞. Since u (g) is continuous and g m → y o R , we have: Step 2. We now prove that y (8) and it maximizes u(y) + δv R (y) − y We conclude that the objective function 
. By the same argument as in Lemma A.8, it follows that there is a N ε (y o R ) in which y R (g) is given by (23). Equation (23), however, implies that y R (g) ≥ 0 only for states g ≥ y * R (δ, d, n). This implies that y R (g) is non-monotonic, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
Since we are in a regular economy, we have W/d > y * * R (δ, d, n). We construct here a concave and monotonic equilibrium with steady state is y o IR (d, n) as defined in (18). We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We first construct the strategies. Remember that y(δ, d) ≡ y *
This is the point at which the solution of the differential equation (14) has slope (1 − d). Define g 2 IR as:
The investment function is defined as:
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can prove that y IR (g) is continuous
and almost everywhere differentiable with right and left derivative at any point, and y IR (g) ∈
it is easy to see that y IR (g) has a unique fixed-point
Step 2. We now construct the value function v IR (g) associated to y IR (g), and prove that
we define the value function exactly as in
Step 2 of Section 8.1.1. For g ≥ y(δ, d), note that y IR (g) < g, so we can define the value function recursively as:
The value function defined above is continuous in g. Using the same argument as in
Step 2 
, and hence it is concave in this interval. It follows that v IR (g) is concave in g ≤ g 4 because u (g) + δv IR (g) ≤ 1 for any g ∈ y(δ, d), g 4 . Using a similar approach we can prove that v IR (g) is concave for all g, and we have u (g) + δv IR (g) ≤ 1 for g ≥ y(δ, d). To prove that
is an equilibrium, we proceed exactly as in Step 3 of Section 8.1.1 to establish that y IR (g) is optimal given v IR (g), and that v IR (g) satisfied (17) given y IR (g).
Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed in two steps.
Step 1 
What remains to be shown is that lim m→∞ y * −1 (1 − δ + δε (1 − δ)) .
Since ε can be taken to be arbitrarily small, for an arbitrarily large m, (29) implies y Step 2. The same argument used in Step 1 of Section 8. 
Corollary 3
Consider the first bullet. Assume a RIE or a IIE, the argument is the same regardless to the irreversibility constraint. Following the same steps as in Case 1 of Section 8.1.2, we can prove that there must be a left neighborhood of y * * R (δ, d, n) such that the investment function is differentiable, its derivative is given by (23) and y (g) > 0 for all points in the neighborhood (see ). This implies that y(g) < y(y * * R (δ, d, n)) = y * * R (δ, d, n) for all g in the neighborhood, and so the convergence path is gradual starting from any point in a neighborhood of the steady state.
Consider now the second bullet. For the case of a RIE we note that, in the characterization of Proposition 1, the investment function is y(g) = min{(1 − d)g + W, y * R (δ, d, n)} in the equilibrium converging to y * R (δ, d, n): so convergence is in finite time (and so not gradual). On the other hand, in a IIE we know by Proposition 3 that there is a d such that for d < d any steady state y 0 must be in a left neighborhood of y * * R (δ, d, n). Given this, we can show that y (g) > 0 in a neighborhood of y 0 following the same steps as in Case 1 of Section 8.1.2. We conclude that for d < d the convergence path is gradual starting from any point in a neighborhood of the steady state.
Proposition 4
We first show that there is a δ 1 < 1, such that for δ > δ 1 the efficient path is a SPE path in a IIE. To this goal, we first define the equilibrium strategies and establish some key properties. (1 − δ) v P (g; d, δ) = W − dg P (d, 1) /n + u(g P (d, 1))
Naturally, associated to an aggregate investment function y l (g; d, δ), l = {M, P }, we have the individual contribution function:
To construct the equilibrium, consider the following trigger strategies. If g τ = y P τ (g 0 ; d, δ) for all τ ≤ t, then i t j (g t ; d, δ) = i P (g; d, δ) ∀j, where i t j (g t ) is the investment at time t of agent j. If ∃τ ≤ t such that g τ = y We now prove that this is an equilibrium. There are two cases to consider. First, when ∃τ ≤ t such that g τ = y The result that we also have a δ 2 < 1, such that for δ > δ 2 the efficient path is a SPE path in a RIE can be proven analogously, so the proof is omitted (but available from the authors upon request). Given this, the statement of the proposition follows immediately by defining δ = max δ 1 , δ 2 .
